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ABSTRACT
Investor confidence and risk tolerance are important concepts that investors are constantly trying
to gauge. Yet these concepts are notoriously hard to measure in practice. Most attempts rely on price
or return data, but these run into trouble when trying to disentangle whether an observed price
change is attributable to a shift in investor confidence or a change in fundamental value. In this
paper, we take an alternative approach by looking at the world-wide holdings and trading of risky
assets. We model global capital markets as the interaction between large global institutional
investors and smaller domestic investors from each country. This permits separation of global price
changes into two components, one that reflects changes in demand and fundamentals perceived by
all investors, and a second that reflects changes in the relative risk tolerance of institutional investors
over and above that of domestics. The latter component, changes in relative risk tolerance of global
institutions, is driven by the willingness of these investors to acquire additional assets in each
country in proportion to their current holdings. Using our model, we show how data on asset
holdings and flows across countries can be used to identify changes in risk tolerance. We then apply
this identification scheme to recent data on the global portfolio holdings of institutional investors.
The resulting measure of risk tolerance impressionistically accords well with periods of market
turbulence and quiescence. It also accounts for a considerable portion of the variation in portfolio
holdings and is informative about future returns.
Kenneth A. Froot
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1 Introduction
Each time there is a major change in global equity prices, investors naturally wonder how to interpret
it. Was it attributable to a change in investor con¯dence (i.e., risk tolerance or sentiment)? If
investors have less tolerance for risk, then presumably equity prices fall. However, this is not the
only conclusion one can draw from a price decline. One sensible alternative is that a fall in asset
fundamentals may have been responsible. That is, expected future cash°ows may have declined, or
the systematic risk of future cash°ows may have increased. Another alternative is that the price
change was attributable to a change in investor wealth. For example, a decline in future wage
income reduces wealth and may undermine investors' willingness to hold stocks.1
With the supply of shares constant in the short run, one or more of the elements of investor
demand|risk tolerance, wealth, and expectations of future fundamentals| must change if prices
are to fall. To successfully extract a measure of risk tolerance from the data, it is necessary to
distinguish among these competing factors. This is particularly di±cult because both investor
con¯dence and asset fundamentals cannot be directly observed. As a result, large and widespread
price changes generate considerable disagreement as to their source. Good examples would include
the 'bubble' in technology stock prices at the end of the last decade, or the Asian crisis of the
mid-to-late-1990s.2
Our approach to identifying investor con¯dence focuses on the behavior of market participants,
rather than on price changes. We do this by allowing for heterogeneity between global institutions
and domestic retail investors, so that they trade with one another. Speci¯cally, we model the
global capital-market equilibrium as having di®erent types of investors: domestic investors from
individual countries who hold only local risky assets and a global risk-free asset (e.g., US Treasury
bills), and a single type of global investor who can trade any and all assets. In this setup, when
global institutional investors are buying assets from a given country, smaller domestic investors from
that country are selling. In equilibrium, these investors trade with each other because of changes
1Our focus in this paper is on investor con¯dence|de¯ned as risk tolerance|and not necessarily on notions of
investor sentiment discussed by many economists. Most approaches to modeling sentiment take investor risk tolerance
as ¯xed, assuming instead that investor expectations depart from those of a rational investor. These approaches are
equivalent if there is only one risky asset. For example, in DeLong, Summers, Shleifer, and Waldmann (1990),
sentiment shocks a®ect the expectations of one group of investors, pushing prices away from a rational level. Shocks
to this group's expectations under constant risk preferences are isomorphic to shocks to the group's risk tolerance
under rational expectations.
2Corsetti, Pesanti and Roubini (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) argue that the price changes in multiple
countries represented shifts in underlying fundamentals. Kyle and Xiong (2002) argue that wealth e®ects were an
important propagation mechanism. Forbes and Rigobon (1999) and Rigobon (2001) hold that the covariance matrix
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in their views about asset fundamentals (expected returns and risk at current prices), changes in
their relative wealth, or changes in their relative risk tolerance.
We assume that all investors observe a fundamental shock in each country, a component of which
is common across investors. This common component may also be correlated across countries or
regions. Because these shocks a®ect all investors symmetrically, they move prices but create no
incentives for trade. Such price changes therefore cannot be interpreted as a change in relative risk
tolerance. However, these price changes can be arbitrarily correlated across countries and regions.
In addition to the common shock, each type of investor also observes his or her own perceived
country-speci¯c fundamentals shock. Unlike the common shock, there are di®erences in these shocks
across global and domestic investors. These shocks therefore generally lead to both trading as well
as price changes. From the perspective of a given investor, investor-speci¯c shocks may be correlated
across countries in a region, but, critically, not across regions. So, for example, global investors may
learn something that causes them to revise upward their expected returns for one country, or all
countries in a region, and therefore, all else equal, to purchase assets from that region's domestics.
Anything global investors may learn that a®ects their expected returns simultaneously across all
countries is assumed to be common across investors, not investor-speci¯c.
With this setup, purchases by global investors that are common across all countries can come
from only two possible sources: changes in wealth or changes in risk tolerance. These two sources
are easily separated given the structure of our model. Because each security can be held by only
one investor type other than the global investors, it is possible to measure all types of investors'
wealth by observing total market capitalization and the holdings of global investors only. Subject
then to an assumption about the form of investors' utility functions, we can isolate shocks to wealth.
The remaining portion of the common component in purchases by global investors is the change in
investor risk tolerance.
The common component across countries of global investor trades we wish to measure is a
proportional one. That is, we look for a common component in purchases as a fraction of global
investor holdings in that country. This is because changes in risk tolerance should a®ect holdings
equiproportionately. To see this, consider what happens if, all else equal, institutional investors' risk
tolerance declines. These investors would then sell risky assets in proportion to their initial holdings.
This pattern of selling is very di®erent from what would take place if expected fundamentals changed
randomly across regions. In such a case, we might at any given time, observe institutional investors
are on average selling across countries. However, the selling would be proportional to the declinesRisk tolerance of interational investors 3
in expected fundamentals, and not proportional to prior holdings.3
Our ability to identify changes in risk preferences relies on the empirical measurement of insti-
tutional investors' evolving positions and trades. We observe directly the wealth and positions of
a large group of international institutional investors. The data are from State Street Corporation
(SSC), and they encompass approximately one eighth of all globally tradable securities. We use
these data to measure the demand by institutional investors for equity securities in 29 markets,
both developed and emerging, over the period January 1996-July 2003. Using our model and the
portfolio °ow and holding information of this group of institutional investors, we can identify shifts
in relative investor con¯dence.
Our approach to con¯dence can be compared to, and contrasted with, a very vast literature on
investor sentiment. Sentiment, broadly interpreted usually means that investor expectations depart
from full rationality. In other words, most economists modeling sentiment let expectations of at least
one group of investors wander, but take risk tolerance as ¯xed. We do the opposite, in that we let risk
tolerance of one group of investors wander, and instead assume that the cross-country components
of expectations are common across investors. These two approaches can appear equivalent if there is
only one risky asset. For example, in Delong, Summers, Shleifer, and Waldmann (1987), sentiment
shocks a®ect the expectations of one group of investors, pushing prices away from a rational level
as these investor buy or sell assets. The same price movement and trading could result if these
investors' expectations were to remain constant, and instead their risk tolerance were to change.
Thus, for a single risky asset there is no observational distinction between con¯dence and sentiment.
With multiple risk assets, however, investor con¯dence and sentiment depart. Con¯dence|or risk
tolerance|is a property of the investor's preferences, and not at all related to the asset. Sentiment,
however, is speci¯c to both the investor and the asset, in that an investor may simultaneously
have positive sentiment about some assets and negative sentiment about others. Nevertheless, with
multiple assets, any common component of an investor's purchases relative to their holdings can
be interpreted either as a con¯dence or sentiment shock, since there is no meaningful distinction
between them.
3This equiproportionate property is a feature of many standard investor demand speci¯cations, such as constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Changes in prices are often associated
with, and used to measure, changes in risk tolerance|see for example Eichengreen, Hale and Mody (2000) and Kumar
and Persaud (2001). As with our approach, this is motivated by the equilibrium implications of the original Tobin
Separation theorem, set out by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Brennan (1989) provides a clear exposition. In a
one-period setting, equilibrium prices equal ( ¹ P ¡µ§1)=r, where ¹ P represents end-of-period prices, µ is risk-tolerance,
§ is the covariance matrix, and r is the risk-free rate. If µ changes, the vector of equilibrium prices changes by ¡§1=r.
Only in special cases (e.g., unchanging fundamentals with an identity covariance matrix) will this produce equal
returns across assets, and, therefore, cross-sectional price changes that are consistent with a change in risk tolerance.Risk tolerance of interational investors 4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple model exploiting our identi¯cation
scheme and demonstrating how we decompose changes in observed asset allocation for a group of
investors. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 estimates the various components of demand,
including investor risk tolerance, by means of the Kalman ¯lter. Speci¯cally, we use the Kalman
¯lter to retrieve a latent common component from the asset allocation data. The technique is similar
to that used by the National Bureau of Economic Research in determining concurrent conditions of
the U.S. economy. Finally, Section 5 characterizes the various components and their relationship to
returns.
2 Asset demand
2.1 The components of equilibrium investor demand





where Pj and Qj are the price and desired quantity of shares held from country j. This implies
that percentage changes in demand can be written as
b Dj = b Qj + b Pj ¡ c W; (2.2)
where the \hat" notation is used to signify log changes.
The task at hand is to decompose the right-hand side of Equation (2.2) into its fundamental
components. Note that with a representative agent model (which assumes that all investors have
identical holdings), b Qj = 0, so that changes in demand are determined by changes in prices and
wealth only. Prices and wealth are observable, making representative agent demand easy to estimate.
However, it is impossible to determine whether an observed change in price is attributable to a
change in the risk appetite of the representative investor or a change in expected risk and return
(given initial prices). In the case of heterogeneous agents, however, we can hope to identify changes
in the preferences of one group versus another. We do this by making some assumptions about the
information each group receives and by observing how ownership of risky assets changes over time.
Equation (2.2) can be decomposed with an asset pricing model that connects demand to risk
tolerance, perceived return and risk. In the case of the international CAPM with a single world con-
sumption basket and CRRA utility, demand is proportional to relative risk tolerance and expectedRisk tolerance of interational investors 5
returns, and inversely proportional to the covariance matrix of returns:
Dj = µ§¡1
j ¹; (2.3)
where µ is risk tolerance, §¡1
j is the jth row of the inverse of the country-return covariance matrix,
and ¹ is the expected excess return vector. In this model, as in many others, changes to demand
emanate from proportionate changes in both risk tolerance and perceived asset-return moments.




For now, we leave open the importance of wealth e®ects across markets by specifying demand as
Dj = (µ=W°)§¡1
j ¹; (2.5)
where ° can vary from 0 (CRRA) to 1 (CARA). Hence the percentage change in the desired
allocation to country j can be written as
b Dj = b µ ¡ °c W + d §¡1
j ¹: (2.6)
Note that over short horizons, ° is likely to be close to one. We return to this point below.
If shocks to ex ante country risk or return were uncorrelated with one another, any common
component of returns would necessarily be attributable to changes in risk aversion, °. In that
case, Equations (2.2) and (2.6) would be su±cient to identify changes in investor risk tolerance. We
could estimate a single factor model of the cross-section of country demands, associate the estimated
factor with (b µ ¡°c W), and leave the country-speci¯c residuals to account for d §¡1
j ¹. Essentially, we
could measure change in risk aversion from price changes without the ambiguity discussed above.
Of course, the assumption that fundamentals are uncorrelated across countries is not realistic.
That is the underlying reason why return data alone are inadequate for measuring investor con¯-
dence. Worldwide shocks to expected returns and risk are very important. The presence of this
common component in fundamentals confounds the identi¯cation of pure risk tolerance changes in
the equations above. To see this, consider the sharp drop in prices recorded globally in 2001. Is
it right to attribute this to a universal decline in risk-tolerance, or to a systematic reduction in
the expected future earnings of assets, especially those in technology-related industries? It is not
possible to obtain the answer from the equations above, since we have not introduced any way of
separating shocks to investor con¯dence from systematic shocks to fundamentals.Risk tolerance of interational investors 6
With a little more structure, however, it is possible to control for common shocks to fundamentals,
and, therefore, to be able to identify changes in risk tolerance. To add structure, we allow for two
groups of investors in each country |internationals (I) and locals (L). The key assumption is
that international investors are free to diversify across countries, but local investors hold only
combinations of their own domestic risky assets and the riskless asset. Under this speci¯cation,
locals' trades with foreigners represent a reallocation of local wealth between the local market
and the riskless asset.4 Thus, we assume Equation (2.6) applies to both internationals and locals,
although locals face restrictions on the assets that they can hold.
The supply of country j's risky assets is ¯xed at Qj. This supply is held only by internationals
and locals from country j itself:
Qj = QI;j + QL;j: (2.7)
Imposing this equilibrium on the earlier demand equations, we can express equilibrium changes in











( b DI;j ¡ b DL;j) + (c WI ¡ c WL;j)
i QI;j
Qj
+ b DL;j + c WL;j: (2.9)
The ¯rst equation says that net purchases by foreigners, b Q¤
I;j, are driven by internationals' excess
demand over locals, and by internationals' excess wealth changes, ( b DI;j ¡ b DL;j) + (c WI ¡ c WL;j),
weighted by the holdings share of locals,
QL;j
Qj
. If locals' holdings are small, they will have already
sold out to internationals, so further reallocations are, all else equal, small from internationals' point
of view.
The second equation shows that price changes contain these same excess demand and excess
wealth terms. However, price changes are not driven so much by excess demand and wealth, as
by the level of demand and wealth. As a result, this equation contains an additional component,
b DL;j + c WL;j, which is the change in domestics' demand and wealth. The equations say that when
there is an improvement in the fundamental outlook, all investors' demands increase (at existing
prices). Prices rise, but this does not require an in°ow of international ownership into local markets.
This happens only when internationals' demands increase by more than locals' demands.
4In the simplest international equilibrium, purchasing power parity holds, so that all investors share the same
consumption basket. In this case, if there is a riskless asset whose return delivers predictable consumption, it applies
to all investors.
5From Equation (2.1), the equilibrium price is (dropping j subscripts) P
¤ = (DIWI + DLWL)=Q. Totally di®er-
entiating, b P
¤ = (b DI + c WI)(QI=Q) + (b DL + c WL;j)(QL=Q) = [(b DI ¡ b DL) + (c WI ¡ c WL;j)](QI=Q) + b DL + c WL;j. b Q
¤
I
follows directly.Risk tolerance of interational investors 7
In the equilibrium, the key quantity is
h
( b DI;j ¡ b DL;j) + (c WI ¡ c WL;j)
i
, the wealth-adjusted excess
demand of internationals relative to locals. Since this is a relative measure, any shock to expected
returns and risk that is global|i.e., shared by both internationals and locals | will be \netted out,"
and the remaining common component of b Qj will re°ect only changes in internationals' relative
wealth or risk tolerance. Thus, an overall improvement in underlying global fundamentals will
positively a®ect prices though b DL;j + c WL;j. Since this improvement has no impact on the relative
wealth-adjusted demands of internationals, there is no impact on relative holdings, b Q¤
I;j.
To see this di®erently, express international and local demand as
b DI;j = b µI ¡ °c WI + ´j + ºI;j (2.10)
b DL;j = b µL ¡ °c WL;j + ´j + ºL;j; (2.11)
where ´j is a global shock to demand shared by locals and internationals, and the ºj terms are
investor-speci¯c residuals. Global changes in fundamentals are picked up by ´j. Then equations










(b µI ¡ b µL) + (1 ¡ °)(c WI ¡ c WL;j) + (ºI;j ¡ ºL;j)
i QI;j
Qj
+ b µL ¡ (1 ¡ °)c WL;j + ´j + ºL;j: (2.13)
Equation (2.12) says that changes in holdings depend on relative changes in risk tolerance and
wealth, (b µI ¡ b µL) + (1 ¡ °)(c WI ¡ c WL;j), plus an error term, (ºI;j ¡ ºL;j). These changes a®ect all
assets in the international portfolio and can therefore be identi¯ed from the cross-section of portfolio
reallocations. This is the strategy we pursue in Section 4. Notice that prices cannot be used in the
same way. Equation (2.13) contains the additional terms b µL ¡ (1 ¡ °)c WL;j + ´j + ºL;j and includes
the common shocks to fundamentals, ´j. Prices respond to any global shock to demand shared by
locals and internationals. The source of this shock could be a change in global fundamentals (i.e.,
an loosening of major-country monetary policy), a change in common risk appetite, or a common
change in wealth. Price changes alone cannot determine the source of the shock. It is in this sense
that holdings data is much more potent than price data for the purposes of measuring risk appetite.
2.2 Cross-correlation and short-run dynamics
The schema laid out above ignores two stylized facts about real-world holdings and portfolio °ow
data. The ¯rst is that °ows tend to be cross-sectionally correlated across regions. The second isRisk tolerance of interational investors 8
that °ows tend to be persistent over time, rather than random. These facts are documented in
Froot, O'Connell and Seasholes (2001) and Gri±n, Nardari and Stulz (2002), and together they
necessitate some modi¯cations to the basic model.
From Equation (2.12), regional correlation in °ows cannot arise from shifts in risk appetite or
wealth, since these would a®ect all countries simultaneously. Nor can it be driven by covariation in
the common beliefs about country risk and return shared by both internationals and locals, since
the term ´j does not appear in the holdings equation.6 Instead, it must arise from cross-sectional
correlation in the relative assessments of risk and return by internationals and locals, captured in
ºI;j ¡ºL;j. For example, if international investors become more bullish about Asia as a whole than
domestic Asian investors, then °ows into individual Asian countries would be correlated, even after
accounting for global shocks. To allow for such regional comovement, we allow for separate regional
covariation in ºI;j ¡ ºL;j in the estimation stage below.
The observed persistence of °ows deserves somewhat more thought. If we think of the holding
horizon as relatively long, then by the law of iterated expectations, short-term updates in expected
returns and expected covariances should be unpredictable. Changes in expected returns and risk
should therefore be serially uncorrelated. The same seems sensible for shocks to risk tolerance.
However, unlike returns and wealth changes, raw changes in portfolio holdings are highly positively
autocorrelated in high frequency data. Typically, once initiated, portfolio rebalancings are persistent
for between three and ¯ve weeks.
Such persistent behavior could of course be rational. It is certainly rational for traders with
private information. Large traders can maximize the value of their private information by breaking
up desired portfolio changes over time and thereby hiding their private information about value. In
e®ect, their demands are less detectable if they substitute current trades for future trades to hide
amongst more random transactions by uninformed investors.7
There are other potential reasons for persistent °ows and sluggish adjustment in holdings. For
example, it is well known that, based on risk and return alone, the optimal level of international
diversi¯cation is much higher than it appears historically (i.e., there is a "home bias" in investor
portfolios). Over time, it seems that the degree of "home bias" has consistently diminished. The
6Of course, co-movement among the ´j terms is the likely driver for the very high levels of price co-movement
within regions.
7Note that in most market-microstructure models with this property (e.g., Kyle 1985), informed order °ow is not
unconditionally autocorrelated; the autocorrelation is conditional on the information. This is not the case with the
actual °ow data, which appear unconditionally autocorrelated. However, in the real world, market makers can't detect
all international investor °ows across markets and apart from the local investor °ows. In e®ect, this makes aggregate
order °ow less than perfectly observable, which is the assumption in Kyle.Risk tolerance of interational investors 9
undoing of this initial home bias may partially account for the persistence in °ows. Agency issues
which lead managers to anchor their asset allocations partly on peer-portfolio concerns would also
suggest a slow adjustment toward otherwise desired levels.
A third possible explanation for the observed short-term dynamics is that risk tolerance itself
adjusts with some stickiness. There is less in the way of theory to support this explanation. However,
it is possible that new information about risk might both change current prices and cause follow-
on trading demand. For example, the large changes in asset prices that accompanied the Russian
default in August 1998 caused many investors to update their beliefs about the riskiness of the
credit markets. Prices fell as anticipated volatility rose. But the higher levels of volatility then
created additional, follow-on sales by institutions that have risk (or VAR) budgets. This may have
magni¯ed future negative price changes and volatilities, leading to persistence in °ows.
Together these explanations suggest that we ought to allow for serial correlation in both ºI;j¡ºL;j
and in risk tolerance µI. The Kalman ¯lter, which we use to estimate the model in Section 4, is
well-suited to this purpose. It allows us distinguish the importance of each type of persistence.
3 Data
The data used to estimate the model are provided by State Street Corporation, one of the world's
largest investor services providers. State Street clients are primarily large institutional global money
managers, and the total of all funds serviced by the Corporation is currently USD 8.5 trillion,
approximately 16 percent of total global assets. Given the nature and sophistication of this globally
footloose client base, we identify all SSC clients as \International" investors for the purpose of
estimating the model. Our sample covers the period from January 1996{July 2003, and encompasses
both the °ows and holdings of this client group in 29 equity markets. The country coverage is shown
in Table 1.
The percentage change in international holdings for a given country and day is calculated as the





where FI;j;t is the °ows of internationals into country j. Implicit here is the assumption that °ows
take place at the start of the day|the quantity FI;j;t= PI;j;t¡1 is purchased at price PI;j;t¡1. An
alternative assumption would be that the °ows FI;j;t take place at the end of the day, and are pricedRisk tolerance of interational investors 10
at PI;j;t, but in practice the di®erence between the two de¯nitions is very small. Weekly changes
in holdings are calculated as the sum of the daily percentage changes. Table 1 below presents some
descriptive statistics for our countries and regions as of June 30th, 2003: MSCI market capitalization
and the percentage of this market capitalization held by the internationl investors in our sample,
the mean weekly percentage change in holdings and the standard deviation of the weekly change in
portfolio holdings.
A key ingredient in the model is the foreign ownership share. To capture this we measure holdings
as a share of market capitalization in each country over time. We use MSCI's measure of market
capitalization, adjusted to control for the recent implmentation of MSCI's Enhanced Methodology.8
This share will underestimate foreign ownership by a factor equal to SSC's share of the global
custody marketplace. However, this turns out not to matter very much for our analysis, since it
is the relative international share across countries that is the key driver, not the absolute level.
Accordingly we make no adjustment for market share. We do, however, wish to mute some of the
\within variation" across the country shares, the idea being that the dispersion of ownership shares
reported by SSC may be partly driven by idiosyncratic factors.9 Toward this end, we average
the individual country foreign ownership share with the global mean foreign ownership share in
calculating our estimate.
8The MSCI Enhanced Methodology adjusts the market capitalization of index constituents for free °oat and targets
for index inclusion 85% of free °oat-adjusted market capitalization in each industry group and in each country. The
Enhanced Methodology was implemented in two phases. The ¯rst, on November 30, 2001, reduced the measured
market capitalization of the developed countries in our sample by an average of 6.6%, and that of emerging markets
in our sample by an average of 21%. The second phase, on May 31, 2002, reduced developed country market
capitalization by an average of 4.7% and emerging markets capitalization by 29%. Accordingly, we scale down our
market capitalization prior to both adjustment dates to avoid any discrete change in the series. See www.msci.com for
details.
9For example, SSC tends to service a disproportionate share of Anglo-Saxon investors.Risk tolerance of interational investors 11
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on portfolio holdings, January 1996{June 2003
Country Market Percentage Mean weekly St. dev. weekly
capitalization in dataset holdings change holdings change
$bn, May 2002 %, May 2002 % %
(a) Developed countries
Australia 300 8.21 0.20 0.45
Canada 371 14.80 0.33 0.74
Eurozone 1962 6.09 0.22 0.43
Japan 1190 5.25 0.28 0.48
New Zealand 13 10.67 -0.03 0.66
Norway 26 6.68 0.08 0.83
Sweden 124 7.43 -0.16 0.94
Switzerland 439 5.86 0.27 0.62
United Kingdom 1581 7.02 0.19 0.36
United States 8358 16.43 0.19 0.18
(b) Latin America
Argentina 4 2.43 -0.12 1.42
Brazil 47 6.08 0.46 1.43
Mexico 47 6.49 0.08 1.33
Peru 3 3.90 -0.17 1.22
(c) East Asia
Hong Kong 89 9.57 0.07 0.89
India 27 7.79 0.37 0.95
Indonesia 9 8.61 0.13 0.85
Korea 118 7.14 0.57 1.31
Malaysia 32 4.60 -0.09 0.83
Philippines 4 8.50 0.22 0.91
Singapore 47 11.18 0.19 0.63
Taiwan 76 5.67 0.68 1.27
Thailand 14 11.60 0.30 0.88
(d) Emerging Europe
Czech Republic 3 7.37 -0.07 0.82
Hungary 6 9.35 0.23 1.19
Poland 8 3.94 0.12 1.21
Turkey 8 3.93 0.11 1.47
(e) Other Emerging
Israel 26 11.57 0.51 1.48
South Africa 82 4.09 0.33 0.55
Descriptive statistics for holdings data as of June 30th, 2003. The change in holdings for a given day is calculated as
the dollar °ow for that day divided by the dollar holdings as of the previous day|i.e. the assumption is that °ows
take place at the start of the day. Weekly changes in holdings are the sum of the daily changes.Risk tolerance of interational investors 12
4 Risk tolerance
4.1 Methodology
As discussed, Equation (2.12) applies to each country in the sample. We use a factor model to extract
h
(b µI ¡ b µL) + (1 ¡ °)(c WI ¡ c WL;j)
i
from the cross-section of the data. In particular, we estimate a




= aj + rt + uj;t; j = 1;:::;N; (4.1)
where the aj are country-speci¯c means, rt is the common factor capturing the e®ects of relative
wealth and risk tolerance on all country exposures, and uj;t ´ b ºI;j ¡ b ºL;j are the orthogonalized
residuals driven by idiosyncratic fundamentals. To cater to the presence of cross-sectional and serial
correlation, we allow rt and uj;t to have autoregressive dynamics, and the residuals to covary within
regions.
To gauge the amount of persistence present in the data, we look ¯rst at the sample partial
autocorrelation functions of the data. The partial autocorrelation at one lag is signi¯cant for all 26
countries. As the lags increase, the number of signi¯cant statistics declines: 16 at lag 2, 10 at lag
3, 8 at lag 4, 5 at lag 5, and 2 at lag 6.10 This suggests that adjustment can take up to 5 weeks,
and accordingly we allow for up to ¯fth-order dynamics in rt and uj;t.
To estimate rt, we use a framework very similar to that used in Stock and Watson (1991). Let
»t capture the state of demand at time t:
»t = [rt u1;t u2;t ¢¢¢ uN;t]0: (4.2)
The elements of »t each have AR(p) dynamics, and disturbances that are cross-sectionally related
within regions:
»t = ©1»t¡1 + ©2»t¡2 + ::: + ©p»t¡p + ²t; (4.3)
where the © matrices are diagonal matrices containing the autoregressive parameters, and ²t is
distributed as
²t » N(0;§); (4.4)
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The sub-matrices §1 through §5 are the covariance matrices for our ¯ve regions identi¯ed in Table
1. In each case, the diagonals capture country variances, and the o®-diagonals capture within-region
covariation. To avoid over-parametrization, we assume that the correlation between all countries in
a region is the same.
With »t as the state vector, we can set up the data-generating process in state space form by
adding the observation equation
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We estimate the model for autoregressive lags of p 2 f1;:::;5g. The likelihood ratio statistics for
the nested models reject p = 5 in favor of p = 4 at the 1% level, but fail to reject p = 4 in favor
of p < 4 at any reasonable signi¯cance level. In addition, they fail to reject regional correlation in
favor of no regional correlation.11 Accordingly, we set p = 4. The key results are displayed in Table
2.
The most striking ¯nding is the persistence of the relative risk tolerance and wealth factor rt.
The sum of its four autoregressive parameters is 0.89. The coe±cients imply that a change in rt
can remain in evidence for quite some time: even after three months, 22 per cent of any shock will
still be present. The idiosyncratic dynamics for each country are also persistent, though to a lesser
11These likelihood ratio tests are available from the authors on request.Risk tolerance of interational investors 14
degree|the sum of the ¯rst four autoregressive coe±cients averages 0.49 across the countries. The
fact that these idiosyncratic dynamics are present suggests that some of the stickiness we observe
in real world °ows is country-speci¯c.
Recall from Equation (2.12) that the common factor is a hybrid of both risk tolerance and relative
wealth. If rt is to be interpreted purely as changes in risk appetite, the in°uence of wealth must
be accounted for. Note ¯rst that, over short horizons, ° is likely to be close to one, in which case
no adjustment is necessary. The most compelling evidence for this is that the volatility of ex post
returns, and hence wealth, is much higher than the volatility of holdings. If CRRA investors were
adjusting their holdings optimally in response to wealth changes, then from Equation (2.4), each
series would have roughly the same percentage volatility. Instead, holdings are about one ¯fth to
one quarter as volatile as wealth at the weekly frequency, implying that the elasticity of demand
with respect to wealth is well below unity. Indeed, given that a portion of holdings volatility comes
from shifts in relative moments ºI;j ¡ ºL;j, the short run value of ° is likely to be above 0.75.
Having said this, we wish to allow for some elasticity of holdings with respect to wealth. To
accomplish this we subtract an estimate of each period's percentage change in wealth, scaled by
the local ownership share, from both sides of Equation (2.12). Note that this adjustment is country
speci¯c|for country j, we need to adjust by the percentage increase in the wealth of internationals|
WI|over and above the percentage increase in the wealth of locals|WL;j. To simplify the calcula-
tion of this relative shift, we consider only equity wealth. Speci¯cally, for country j, the adjustment
is calculated as the percentage change in international's total equity holdings, less the percentage
change in the market capitalization of country j.Risk tolerance of interational investors 15
Table 2: Estimated common factor model based on U.S. investor holdings August 1994{July 2002
Series Á1 Á2 Á3 Á4 Reg. corr
rt 0.267 0.234 0.275 0.113
(a) Developed countries
Australia 0.183 -0.039 0.051 0.046
Canada 0.206 0.028 0.091 0.258
Eurozone 0.183 0.081 0.036 -0.025
Japan 0.318 0.205 0.045 0.015
New Zealand 0.226 0.158 0.030 0.066 0.032
Norway 0.237 0.023 0.170 0.168
Sweden 0.374 0.122 0.028 0.046
Switzerland 0.298 0.159 0.027 0.102
United Kingdom 0.475 0.028 0.102 0.081
United States 0.266 0.007 0.113 0.029
(b) Latin America
Argentina 0.310 0.044 0.150 -0.041
Brazil 0.223 0.110 0.117 -0.015
Mexico 0.339 0.023 0.146 0.042 0.051
Peru 0.227 0.190 0.005 0.062
(c) East Asia
Hong Kong 0.387 0.046 0.113 0.035
India 0.262 0.116 0.154 0.041
Indonesia 0.212 0.138 0.007 0.105
Korea 0.356 0.132 0.099 -0.020
Malaysia 0.294 0.174 0.131 0.071 0.083
Philippines 0.366 0.106 0.073 0.072
Singapore 0.158 0.111 0.166 0.049
Taiwan 0.319 0.089 0.034 0.126
Thailand 0.243 0.006 0.013 -0.018
(d) Emerging Europe
Czech Republic 0.160 0.113 -0.037 0.011
Hungary 0.247 0.098 0.168 0.042
Poland 0.301 0.136 0.136 0.060 0.095
Turkey 0.290 -0.083 0.045 -0.004
(e) Other Emerging
Israel 0.183 -0.019 0.013 0.135 0.075
South Africa 0.266 -0.030 0.065 0.134
Estimated autoregressive parameters for common factor rt and country-speci¯c disturbances. Estimation is carried
out using the Kalman ¯lter.
Figure 1 plots the two resulting estimates of changes in risk tolerance. The upper panel shows
risk tolerance rt under the assumption that ° = 1, while the lower panel assumes ° = 0:75|i.e.
some wealth adjustment. Both are qualitatively similar at the weekly frequency, and indeed the
weekly correlation is 0.87. The wealth-adjusted series does appear to be somewhat less volatileRisk tolerance of interational investors 16
























Risk tolerance unadjusted for wealth changes (γ = 1)
























Risk tolerance adjusted for wealth changes (γ = 0.75)
Figure 1: Estimated risk tolerance, with and without wealth adjustments, August 1994-July 2002
week-to-week.
Interestingly, the series appear to re°ect a number of the more volatile periods in recent years,
including the onset of the Asian crisis at end 1997, the LTCM collapse accompanied by the Russian
default in August 1998, the global equity turn-down in 2000, and more recently the global equity
market volatility of July 2002.12 This is striking given that no prices or returns are used in the
construction of the series.13
5 Risk tolerance and prices
We investigate the importance of our measure of risk tolerance in two ways. First, we undertake
the variance decompositions suggested by Equations (2.12) and (2.13). Speci¯cally, we calculate the
share of unconditional °ow and return variation that is accounted for by the (appropriately scaled)
common factor. Second we investigate whether the risk tolerance measure has any forecasting power
for returns.
12Six of the ten highest volume days ever recorded on the New York Stock Exchange occurred in July 2002.
13Of course, prices do a®ect wealth, which is a component of the second, adjusted series.Risk tolerance of interational investors 17
5.1 Variance decomposition
Table 3 reports the share of holdings and price variation that stems from variation in risk tolerance
at various frequencies from 1 to 26 weeks.14 In each case, the ¯gures are the R2 statistics from
regressions using overlapping intervals. Changes in risk tolerance (scaled by local ownership share)
are seen to be quite important in accounting for variation in holdings. For the major markets, up
to one-third of the one-week change in holdings stems from a change in risk tolerance, and this
percentage rises substantially as the horizon lengthens, reaching as much as 74 per cent for the euro
region at the half-year frequency. For developing markets, the shares are generally smaller though
important nonetheless. Turning to prices, the variation accounted for by changes in risk tolerance
(scaled now by the foreign ownership shaer) is in the range of 1{2 percent at the one-week horizon,
rising to an average of 11.7 percent at the half-year frequency. These somewhat lower levels should
not be surprising: Equation (2.13) indicates that the bulk of the variation in prices will come from
variation in local wealth, and critically, variation in commonly perceived fundamentals. In fact, the
low variance decomposition numbers belie the importance of rt for forecasting returns, and it is to
this that we now turn.
14For holdings changes, we could also look at the variance decomposition for k-step ahead prediction errors based on
the state-space model set out in Section 3. The results are qualitatively similar to the simpler decomposition reported
here.Risk tolerance of interational investors 18
Table 3: Percentage of variation accounted for by unadjusted estimate of changes in risk tolerance
Flows Returns
Horizon (weeks) 1 4 13 26 1 4 13 26
(a) Developed countries
Australia 4.2 7.1 12.5 12.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.8
Canada 0.2 0.0 0.8 3.0 1.6 3.5 1.8 2.0
Eurozone 34.2 52.7 68.6 74.4 1.8 5.8 9.5 16.5
Japan 21.3 27.3 31.9 29.8 0.1 0.0 2.3 5.1
New Zealand 2.8 3.7 6.9 10.7 0.4 5.4 0.0 0.4
Norway 3.7 5.5 7.8 7.9 1.2 9.9 6.9 10.0
Sweden 2.8 3.3 2.0 0.0 1.4 6.9 4.4 5.8
Switzerland 6.6 9.3 8.6 7.9 1.4 6.1 9.1 25.5
United Kingdom 31.2 38.5 48.7 59.5 1.6 11.4 12.1 33.5
United States 30.1 41.4 48.2 44.6 1.2 6.4 8.2 17.3
(b) Latin America
Argentina 7.8 12.5 25.0 31.4 0.2 6.9 0.6 1.3
Brazil 17.2 33.7 56.3 64.5 0.4 8.0 1.4 3.8
Mexico 3.3 5.9 13.2 17.8 0.8 2.8 1.2 0.2
Peru 7.1 9.7 8.4 8.1 0.1 10.9 0.6 0.5
(c) East Asia
Hong Kong 10.7 19.9 29.6 37.8 0.0 0.6 4.6 11.0
India 3.0 5.0 6.9 7.8 0.0 5.3 5.8 17.2
Indonesia 11.7 17.2 21.5 26.2 0.0 0.2 3.7 8.5
Korea 29.1 49.2 64.7 74.2 0.5 1.4 0.1 0.9
Malaysia 6.1 6.9 7.0 7.1 0.0 0.1 7.4 13.1
Philippines 6.9 15.7 35.8 48.0 0.1 0.3 14.4 33.5
Singapore 9.0 20.0 38.1 51.3 1.2 0.6 0.5 2.1
Taiwan 5.2 9.3 15.6 17.0 2.5 8.0 9.3 13.4
Thailand 12.0 23.5 37.6 44.8 1.5 1.6 3.8 1.7
(d) Emerging Europe
Czech Republic 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 3.5 0.3 0.3
Hungary 13.9 33.7 56.9 65.2 0.4 17.3 0.1 0.0
Poland 20.4 40.3 55.6 60.8 0.1 6.9 1.9 6.3
Turkey 6.5 10.5 17.8 28.6 0.8 1.6 1.6 2.9
(e) Other Emerging
Israel 21.4 38.9 55.3 61.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.4
South Africa 17.0 30.7 46.6 52.7 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.4
Variance decomposition for °ows and returns based on estimated risk tolerance factor (unadjusted for wealth). Results
are similar using wealth-adjusted factor. Each entry shows the percentage share of unconditional variance that is
accounted for by variation in the common factor.
5.2 Return forecasting
To provide a baseline for the forecasting value of rt, we ¯rst estimate a naÄ ³ve momentum model
of equity returns. Speci¯cally, we attempt to forecast next week's return on the basis of the last
four weeks of returns. Whether carried out for individual countries or in a panel setting, the resultsRisk tolerance of interational investors 19
for this baseline model are, unsurprisingly, mixed. Table 4 displays the panel estimates. They
suggest that, for all countries, the returns over the recent four weeks are informative about the next
week's returns, but the R2's are modest, averaging under 1%. The same is true when developed
and emerging markets are separated. For emerging markets, there is some reasonable evidence of
equity return momentum, consistent with the stylized facts established elsewhere in the literature,
while for developed markets, there is some evidence of high-frequency reversal.
Introducing lags of the estimated risk tolerance factor into the regression brings a meaningful
improvement in explanatory power. For developed markets, the change in risk tolerance recorded in
the last week has a strong, statistically signi¯cant impact on the forecast return for this week. The
e®ect is economically signi¯cant too: a one-standard deviation increase in risk tolerance (scaled by
foreign ownership share) translates to an increase in forecasted return of between 10 and 20 basis
points for the next week in developed markets. For emerging markets, which the coe±cient on
the ¯rst lag is insigni¯cant, the coe±cients on the second and third lags also indicate a positive
relationship between returns and lagged changes in risk tolerance. Interestingly, there is evidence
that only a portion of this return e®ect is permanent. The coe±cent on the fourth lag of the risk
tolerance measure is strongly negative for all countries, suggesting that some, but not all, of the
impact e®ect on returns is reversed over the course of the subsequent month. The introduction
of the risk tolerance factor causes the R2 to double in all speci¯cations. The average explained
variation for developed markets is almost 1.5%. This is economically signi¯cant, since it implies
an (in-sample) informatio ratio moment of approximately 0.88 for each country, before transactions
costs.
Similar results were obtained using the wealth-adjusted measure of risk tolerance. We conclude,
then, that the preference factor contains some information about future returns.Risk tolerance of interational investors 20
Table 4: Panel regression estimates of return forecasting models, weekly frequency, 08/1994{7/2002
Lagged returns Lagged risk tolerance R2(%)
Lag 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
(a) All countries
Coe±c. 0.002 0.066 0.066 -0.021 0.643
St. err. 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Coe±c. 0.000 0.060 0.055 -0.013 -0.034 0.612 0.254 -1.260 1.394
St. err. 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.131 0.135 0.134 0.129
(b) Developed countries
Coe±c. -0.066 0.046 0.026 -0.022 0.713
St. err. 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
Coe±c. -0.072 0.036 0.018 -0.016 0.235 0.396 0.054 -0.725 1.487
St. err. 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.150 0.153 0.152 0.147
(c) Emerging markets
Coe±c. 0.014 0.068 0.073 -0.022 0.977
St. err. 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Coe±c. 0.013 0.061 0.060 -0.013 -0.154 0.742 0.372 -1.570 2.176
St. err. 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.184 0.189 0.189 0.182
Panel regression estimates of return forecasting model without and with estimated risk tolerance factor (unadjusted
for wealth). Results are similar using wealth-adjusted factor. Estimation is carried out by OLS.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a methodology for measuring investor con¯dence by decomposing
investor demand for international assets. The framework is based on an examination of the cross-
section of international portfolio holdings and °ows of international institutional investors over time.
We estimate our model using data that provides comprehensive coverage on the equity holdings of
U.S. investors across 29 countries over the period January 1996 through July 2003. Using these data,
we decompose observed shifts in aggregate investor demand into expected risk and return, wealth
and risk tolerance components. The risk tolerance component turns out to account for a substantial
portion of variation in portfolio holdings and a smaller but meaningful amount of variation in equity
returns. In addition, it appears to be informative about future returns.Risk tolerance of interational investors 21
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